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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -1954
diction 0 Even though the errors are set forth in a definite and specific
manner there must be evidence to support them. The supreme court can
only reverse a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals when its shall deter-
mine that its decision is unreasonable or unlawfulY'
MAU-MCH S. CULP
TORTS
Negligence
Function of Judge and of Jury - Res Ipsa Loquitur
In the battle between plaintiffs and defendants in negligence cases,
part of the strategy involves the manipulation of the evidence and the
jury. Often one party wants the case to go to the jury while the other
does not. Deeply involved in the interplay is the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence to present a jury question on either causation or lack of due
care elements. Such a case may or may not be complicated by the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. There were a number of cases illustrating this general
problem which were reported from the Ohio Supreme Court during 1954.
In one such case,' plaintiff was walking by defendant's place of business in
Youngstown when she fell -into "rough depressions and elevations" in the
sidewalk, suffering severe injuries. She showed in the trial that defendant
was remodeling -his -building and that heavy trucks had -ridden over the
areas of the sidewalk in question. Not even a jury question, ruled -the
supreme court. Plaintiff had not shown that defendant was responsible for
any particular vehicle that broke the sidewalk In another case,2 plaintiff
was driving a car purchased from defendant when the car suddenly went out
of control and caused plaintiff great loss. Plaintiff proved that he had
taken the car to defendant for repairs. He also showed that he had advised
defendant that something was wrong with -the steering mechanism. De-
fendant claimed that the malady had been corrected. The key to the case
was a kingpin in the steering mechanism. Investigation subsequent to
plaintiff's mishap revealed .the pin was broken. Plaintiff lost, however,
because he could not prove exactly when the pin was broken: before, during
or after the crash 3
By degrees we move into the res ipsa loquitur problem. The following
'Roose v. Board of Revision of Cuyahoga County, 161 Ohio St. 522. 119 N.E.2d
885 (1954). Revised Code Section 5717.04 governs appeals from the Board of
Tax Appeals to the Supreme Court.
1 Queen City Valves, Inc. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 579, 120 N.E.2d 310 (1954), con-
struing Revised Code Section 5717.02.
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facts were held to fall short of that line: Plaintiff was having his car
lubricated in one of the defendant's service stations. As plaintiff stepped
onto the hoist track to get into his car, he stepped into a slippery "foreign"
substance, falling and suffering bodily injury. The supreme court affirmed
a directed verdict for defendant,4 apparently on the ground that to let the
jury have the case would be to let it engage in sheer speculation.' The same
result would follow, said the court gratuitously, even if plaintiff had proven
the substance to be grease.
In Ohio, as in most states, if a case can be brought within the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, the jury will be allowed to determine whether the de-
fendant was or was not negligent.6  A major obstacle in getting a case to
the jury under this doctrine is 'the "exclusive control" requirement. Much
of the allocation of function in decision-making between judge and jury is
channeled through this element. Illustrative of the point are two cases re-
ported from the supreme court. In Krupar v. Procter & Gamble Co..7 the
plaintiff purchased a bar of defendant's soap in its original wrapper from a
retail store. The soap was unwrapped and placed in plaintiff's bathroom.
Subsequently, eight days after purchase, plaintiff used the soap in taking a
bath and was scratched by a piece of wire embedded in the soap. Complica-
tions followed from -the scratch. The court ruled as a matter of law that
defendant had not had exclusive control of the soap. In so deciding the
court overruled a trial verdict and successful intermediate appeal for the
'Eichon v. Lustig's, Inc., 161 Ohio St. 11, 117 N.E.2d 436 (1954).
'Landon v. Lee Motors, Inc., 161 Ohio St. 82, 118 N.E.2d 147 (1954).
'An analogous situation arose in Lopresti v. Community Traction Co., 160 Ohio St.
480, 117 N.E.2d 2 (1954). Plaintiff, suing for wrongful death, showed that de-
fendant injured deceased but could not establish from medical testimony any con-
nection between the injury and the cancer which produced the death.
See also Scott v. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., 122 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio App. 1953).
Plaintiff here claimed she was knocked down in defendant's store while defendant's
servants were chasing an escaping shoplifter. The court held that since store owners
are not insurers of their customers' safety, plaintiff must lose since she could not show
exactly how she was knocked down. She might have been knocked down by one of
the voluntary pursuers who along with plaintiff had been shopping in the store.
'Parras v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 315, 116 N.E.2d 300 (1954).
'Might not the jury in effect make the financially able defendant an insurer? In
other states the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur seems to be used for just such a liberal
purpose. Perhaps it is equally as valid for the Ohio Supreme Court to reflect its
conservative, protector attitude toward industry by keeping such cases from the jury.
'A general statement of the rule is that the instrumentality involved must have been
within the "exclusive control" of the defendant and must have caused plaintiff dam-
age under circumstances indicating a high probability of negligence. Facts meeting
this formula leave less to the imagination and emotions and so may safely be passed
to the jury by the trial judge.
160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
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plaintiff." In Koktavy v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc., the plaintiff
purchased some fireworks including an aerial salute bomb manufactured
by the defendant. The purchase was made through a retail jobber. Such
bombs are supposed to explode after rising into the air. This bomb ex-
ploded on the ground after plaintiff lit the fuse, injuring plaintiff. The
court of appeals overruled a directed verdict for the defendant, but was in
turn overruled by the supreme court. The latter court ruled as a matter
of law that plaintiff had not sufficiently shown that the bomb had been
handled with due care while in the possession of the retailer. In either of
these two cases, the jury might have been allowed to decide the matter
determined by the court: Did plaintiff sufficiently preclude the negligence
of others who had possession of the instrumentality involved? The Ohio
Supreme Court seems to show little faith in juries in this area. Thus, Ohio
is one of the states known for interpreting the exclusive control element
comparatively strictly.
Given defendant's exclusive control over the injury-causing instru-
mentality, plaintiff's problem of getting to the jury is not so difficult. In
Manker v. Shaffer,'° plaintiff was, along with eight other people, a paying
rider in a station wagon driven by defendant. While in transit the vehicle
suddenly swerved off the road and hit a tree. Plaintiff sued defendant for
negligence. In reversing a directed verdict for defendant, the supreme
court held this was properly a case for the jury since the facts supported a
permissible inference of negligence on the defendant's part."
Duty - Relationship
One of -the prerequisites .to the establishment of a prima facie case of
negligence is the showing of a duty in defendant to use due care to protect
plaintiff from the injury involved. Various factors enter into both the
determination that a duty is owed and the definition of the scope of that
duty. One of the factors is the weighing of the competing interests of
plaintiff and defendant, or in shorthand, the "relationship" of the parties.
1. Parent-Child
The supreme court wrote the second and probably last chapter to Signs
V. Signs.'2 The plaintiff was six and one-half years old when he suffered
'See 5 WnsT. REs. L. Rlv. 315 (1954) for comment on court of appeals decision.
* 160 Ohio St. 461, 117 N.E.2d 16 (1954).
10161 Ohio St. 285, 118 N.E.2d 641 (1954).
1 Of particular importance in such a case is the absence of any explanation by de-
fendant regarding the collision. Otherwise it must be that the Supreme Court is less
concerned about insurance companies than about manufacturers. (Assuming the
court is ever consciously controlled by other factors than the mere legal doctrines.)
1161 Ohio St 241, 118 N.E.2d 411 (1954).
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his injury. He lived with his parents. His father and another person were
partners engaged in the business of selling gasoline from pumps located on
premises owned by the mother of the plaintiff. While plaintiff and some
other children were playing with the pump, plaintiff became splattered
with gasoline. Later, another child struck a match. Plaintiff sued for the
resultant injury. The court decided in the first opinion that the father was
not immune from suit by his son since the damage had occurred by virtue of
the father's pursuit of his business.'" In the second opinion, -the count held
as a matter of law that the father owed no greater duty to his child than to
warn him to stay away from the pump - and this the father had done. The
court seemed to be shocked at any notion -that a father might owe a greater
legal duty to his child than he owes to a social guest. Even assuming the
social guest analogy is a good one,14 why not leave to the jury the question
whether the giving of a warning is the only action a reasonable man would
take to protect a six and one-half year old social guest under such circum-
stances.
15
2. Automobile Driver-Rider
In Birmelin v. Gist," an action for wrongful death, ,it was decided by
the supreme court that the guest statute"' was applicable even though the
defendant driver was offered compensation for gas consumed in driving
decedent home. Therefore, defendant would be liable only for wanton
misconduct. Such an offer of compensation is merely a social gesture
and not a business arrangement, according to the court, unless it can be
shown that the driver intended to assume additional risks of liability.
3. Landlord and Tenant
In Marshman v. Stanley' the owners of a rooming house were sued
for the wrongful death of two roomers, husband and wife. A former
operator of the premises had negligently installed gas conduits in such
" 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
" The court cannot be too much criticized for limiting the scope of the duty here.
For an essentially conservative court, it has gone quite far in recognizing any duty at
all. Once the duty gains acceptance and becomes "old hat," then surely a future
court must find a father owes a greater legal duty to his son than he owes to the boy
up the street - under the reasonable man rule.
"5 There was insurance, of course, as a reading of the first Signs case will show. Is
the second Signs case another example of judicial control over possible "emotional"
jury verdicts? In addition, the court briefly lists the Ohio cases which have refuted
the attractive nuisance doctrine. Admitting that the full sway of that doctrine may
leave too much to juries, the court could take a middle ground and give some con-
sideration to the facts of life.
162 Ohio St. 46, 120 N.E.2d 711 (1954).
17OHIO REV. CODE § 4515.02.
122 N.E.2d 482 (Ohio App. 1952).
[Spring
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fashion that a fatal explosion resulted when decedent husband struck a
match to light his pipe. The dangerous condition was apparently unknown
to the defendant landlords. Held, by a court of appeals, a landlord is not
liable for such an occurrence in the absence of a showing of fraud or con-
cealment In other words, the landlord is under no duty to inspect for
dangerous conditions on his premises. 9
4. Municipalities and Pedestrians
In Kimball v. City of Cincinnati" plaintiff sued for injuries received
when she tripped over a fault in one of defendant's sidewalks. The fault
consisted of a difference in the level of two adjoining sections -a differ-
ence of from one-half to three-fourths of an inch. The condition had
existed for thirteen years, but apparently no one had called it -to .the city's
attention. Noting that .the city was not an insurer, the supreme court ruled
that allowing the existence of such a defect was as a matter of law not negli-
gence. Overruled were a trial court and an appellate court and a substantial
judgment in plaintiff's favor. Perhaps we may expect future rulings by the
court that seven-eighths of an inch is not for the jury but that fifteen-six-
teenths of an inch is.
Violation of a Statute
Eisenhuth v. Moneyho. 2 illustrates how the facts of a case may be given
to the jury to determine whether the defendant acted reasonably, even
though a statute is involved. In Ohio, a driver on -the highways is required
to give "proper" signals of his intention to -turn his vehicle from one lane to
another.22 In this case it was held that the standard of care imposed'by the
statute was not specific enough so that the question whether a proper signal
was given, or whether any signal at all should have been given, was one for
,the jury.23
1. Assured Clear Distance Ahead Statute24
In Rogers v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,25 plaintiff ran into an unlighted
The holding is not novel, but many bad rules are equally traditional. In this par-
ticular case, the outcome is not so harsh since the original wrongdoer was also a party
to the suit.
" 160 Ohio St. 370, 116 N.X.2d 708 (1954).
21161 Ohio St. 367, 119 N.E.2d 440 (1954).
2OHio REv. CODE § 4511.39.
'At least under the facts of this case where a driver is moving from the right hand
lane to the next lane on a four lane highway and does not signal to a driver behind
him.
'
4 OHioRv. CODE§ 4511.21.
"95 Ohio App. 62, 117 N.E.2d 451 (1954). The case cited in footnote 21, supra,
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trailer truck parked partially on the highway. He sued the owner of the
trailer track for negligence. The trial judge left to the jury .the question of
plaintiff's contributory negligence. The court of appeals affirmed on the
theory that plaintiff had taken himself out of the assured clear distance ahead
statute by showing his attention had been diverted by an oncoming car in
his lane. One judge vigorously dissented that plaintiff was clearly within
the statute and so should have been found contributorily negligent as a mat-
ter of law. The judge argued that the evidence was uncontradicted that
plaintiff continued to travel faster -than required by the statute after the
emergency had ceased. 26
Proximate Cause
As with some of the other cases reviewed in this section, Hartman v.
Hinton2 l is of interest not so much for any startling rule of law laid down
or novel facts as for its illustration of how appellate judges may exercise a
good deal of control over the jury function under the traditional concepts
of negligence, in this case the matter of proximate cause. Plaintiff was a
guest rider in an automobile which ran into an unlighted road roller. The
road roller was parked in an area of the highway which was under repair. The
highway was open to traffic, but there is no real discussion in the case as
to the propriety of the road roller's being parked where it was or as to the
unreasonableness of its being parked without warning lights. The driver
of the car in which plaintiff was riding was apparently the only witness
regarding the reasons for the collision. He testified that the lights of an
approaching car blinded him causing him to pull to the right side of the
road. He then lost control of the car in the unimproved portion of the
highway and collided with the road roller. Defendant was given a judg-
ment in the court of appeals, notwithstanding a verdict below, apparently
on the basis that the driver said in answer to cross examination that even
if there had been lights on the road roller, he probably would have run into
it. Thus, there was no "causal connection between -the defendant's negli-
gence and the plaintiff's injury" -reasonable minds could not arrive at
involves a finding that a jury must determine whether the statute involved was vio-
lated. This case involves an apparently different way out of a statute; a holding that
a violation is excusable under certain circumstances to be determined by the jury.
The process is really the same in the two cases.
- One cannot blame a trial judge for passing doubtful cases to the jury. The major-
ity opinion may perhaps be best justified (even granting the dissenter's remarks
about the defendant's speed) on the theory that a reasonable man may not be aware
of his speed, even though a judge may determine from an exercise of hindsight when
the emergency was in fact ended.
-7122 N.E.2d 646 (Ohio App. 1953).
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